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Abstract: Society has changed tremendously in the last decade. It still is in a 
transitional phase because of different technological developments. These evo-
lutions affect our way of thinking, doing business, communicating, interaction 
and the work/life balance. Some argue that the legal framework will need a fun-
damental make-over as well. The question that arises is whether some of the 
existing long-standing legal principles are compatible with technological evolu-
tions or whether new legislation will need to be adopted. The article will try to 
provide an answer to these fundamental issues through a case-study of recent 
evolutions in two different fields of law, namely the use of social media in court 
proceedings for procedural law and the introduction of self-driving cars in traffic 
for liability law. 
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Summary: The article examines whether existing legal principles are compatible 
with technological evolutions or whether new legislation will need to be imple-
mented. We will examine two evolutions more thoroughly, namely the use of 
social media for service of process and the commercialisation of autonomous 
vehicles. A new phenomenon has arisen in a number of common law jurisdic-
tions around the world. In Australia, the United States, New Zealand, Canada 
and England there are examples of cases in which social media platforms were 
used to notify the defendant of the commencement of civil proceedings (this 
is called service of process). In civil law nations, effecting service of process 
through social media is completely unknown. This is remarkable in light of the 
obvious importance of this topic for the continental EU Member States, given 
the digital reality and the continuous objective to increase the functionality of 
dispute resolution. Although it is difficult to predict whether the legislator in ci-
vil law countries will endorse social media service, it is argued that social media 
service could be valuable as an additional method in Belgium when the defen- 
dant does not have a known address in order to strengthen the likelihood of ac-
tual notice. Another technological evolution relates to the commercialisation of 
autonomous vehicles. The increased use of self-driving cars has several benefits. 
However, legal challenges will come to the surface as well. One of these relates 
to the question who should be held liable for damage caused by autonomous 
vehicles. At the present time, things are quite clear. The manufacturer of (parts 
of) the vehicle or its driver can in most cases be held liable under national or 
supranational law for the damage caused by the accident. The article will show 
that things are more complex with self-driving cars and that the existing legal 
framework might need some changes.  
1. Introduction 
Society has changed tremendously in the last decade. It still is in a transi-
tional phase because of different technological developments. These evolutions 
affect our way of thinking, doing business, communicating, interaction and the 
work/life balance. It is, therefore, not surprising that several aspects related to 
those technological evolutions are increasingly being studied in academia3 and 
3  See in general: BROWNSWORD, Roger, SCOTFORD, Eloise & YEUNG, Karen, The Oxford 
Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology, 1st ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017; 
CALO, Ryan, FROOMKIN, Michael & KERR, Ian, Robot Law, 1st ed., Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2016. 
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addressed by policymakers.4 The question that arises from a legal point of view is 
whether some of the existing long-standing legal principles are compatible with 
technological evolutions or whether new legislation will need to be adopted. In 
this regard, it is often argued that the law lags behind technological develop-
ment.5 Technological evolutions may expose gaps in the existing legal frame-
work or may give rise to undesirable conflicts and call for changes.6 We will try 
to provide an answer to these fundamental issues through a case-study of recent 
evolutions in two different fields of law, namely the use of social media for notice 
of court proceedings in the area of procedural law (part 2) and the introduction 
of self-driving cars (SDCs) or autonomous vehicles in the area of liability law 
(part 3). We will conclude by giving some (general) recommendations that can 
be taken into account by policymakers, judges and lawyers when creating or 
applying the law in the “society of tomorrow” (part 4). 
2. The Use of Social Media in Service of Process
After some preliminary considerations on the use of social media in ser-
vices of process (part 2.1), we will describe the current common law trend of 
effecting service of process through social networking sites (part 2.2). We then 
give a short overview of how service of process is effectuated in Belgium, as an 
example of a civil law country (part. 2.3). Finally, having taken note of the service 
of process framework in Belgium and the absence of social media as a form of 
acceptable notice, we reflect on the possible introduction of such service within 
that jurisdiction (part 2.4).
4  Reference can be made to the working of the EU High Level Group GEAR 2030. The Group 
discussed the main challenges for the automobile industry in the next fifteen years and made 
recommendations to ensure that the relevant policy, legal and public support framework is in 
place for the roll-out of highly automated and connected vehicles by 2030 (High Level Group on 
the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in the European Union 
(GEAR 2030), “Ensuring that Europe has the most competitive, innovative and sustainable au-
tomotive industry of the 2030s and beyond”, October 2017). The European Parliament has also 
adopted a resolution on the 16th of February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on 
civil law rules on robotics (European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommen-
dations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103INL)). 
5  See for example: MOSES, Bennett, “Agents of Change: How the Law “Copes” with Techno-
logical Change”, Griffith Law Review, no. 20, 2011, 763-794, 764; MARCHANT, Gary, AL-
LENBY, Braden & HERKERT, Joseph, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and 
Legal-Ethical Oversight: The Pacing Problem, 1st ed., New York, Springer Science & Business 
Media, 2011. 
6  LEENES, Ronald et al, “Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines”, Law, Innovation 
and Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 1-44, 7. 
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2.1. Preliminary Considerations 
Imagine you open the Facebook Messenger app and you see the new mes-
sage notification. It is a message informing you that you have been sued and 
that you are to appear in court as defendant in a family law case involving proof 
of paternity. Or: you are browsing through Instagram when you suddenly re-
ceive a DM (Direct Message). There is a lawsuit pending against you. You have 
been served in an insurance matter through the DM. Or: you often use LinkedIn 
to keep track of your contacts’ occupations and achievements. One day your 
LinkedIn inbox indicates that you have a new message. The LinkedIn message 
contains a summons and a claim form. A foreign company is taking you to court 
for trademark infringement. Futuristic scenarios? Think again! These situations 
have actually taken place in the last decade in Australia7, Canada8 and the United 
States9 respectively. 
In a number of common law jurisdictions around the world courts have 
allowed plaintiffs to notify the defendant of the commencement of legal pro-
ceedings (i.e. service of process) through the use of social networking platforms. 
The list of social media is long but the ones most often used for service of process 
are Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Instagram. When mentioning this relatively 
recent line of private law cases to lawyers with civil law backgrounds, reactions 
ranging from mild amused surprise to utter shock and disgust can be observed. 
In civil law nations effecting service of process through social media is com-
pletely unknown.10 Whereas the use of e-mail for service purposes seems to have 
become increasingly more well established, the use of social media as an avenue 
for notification of the commencement of proceedings appears to be in a whole 
different ballpark. As such, scholars in continental EU Member States (by which 
we refer to those EU countries that belong to the civil law tradition) have not yet 
addressed this relatively new development within the common law world. This is 
unfortunate as getting insight into the practice might prove valuable for enhan- 
cing our own service rules. This contribution, therefore, undertakes an analysis 
7  Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, Byrne & Howard, 21 April 2010, [2010] FMCAfam 509.
8  A report of the case is available here: ROBINSON, Alex, Toronto lawyer serves claim with Ins-
tagram, 2 February 2018, http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/author/alex-robinson/
toronto-lawyer-serves-claim-with-instagram-15294/, read on 2 May 2018.
9  United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, WhosHere, Inc. v. 
Gokhan Orun, 20 February 2014, 2014 WL 670817.
10  There is, to our knowledge, only one example where social media were used in the transmission 
of judicial documents. In order to initiate Dutch court proceedings Stichting BREIN (Bescherm-
ing Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland) served the Pirate Bay (a website registered 
in Sweden) through Twitter and Facebook, in addition to the conventional methods of service 
(Rechtbank Amsterdam, 30 July 2009, no. 428212 / KG ZA 09-1092 WT/RV).
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of the reported cases to subsequently contemplate on a general level whether 
social media service will ever form part of the service methods on the EU con-
tinent. 
2.2. Social Media Service in Common Law: State of Play
As mentioned, common law countries are the laboratory in which service 
through social media platforms has been allowed to flourish. After a brief dis-
cussion of the origin of the use of social media in service of process (part A), we 
will examine the conditions laid down by the case law more thoroughly (part B). 
A. Origin 
The actual cradle of social media service is to be situated in Australia (at 
least judging by the reported cases). The ball begun rolling with a case between a 
mortgage provider and a couple that no longer made its repayments.11 In MKM 
v. Corbo & Poyser the defendants had taken out a home refinancing loan with 
MKM Capital but had failed to keep up with payments. They not respond to 
e-mails from MKM’s attorneys and did not appear in court. MKM obtained a 
default judgment permitting seisure of the property. Before the judgment could 
be executed it had to be served on the defendants. However, defendants had 
moved away, had switched jobs and had changed their phone numbers. Repeated 
efforts at personal service as well as service by mail and publication did not lead 
to the desired result. MKM therefore made the ground-breaking move of see- 
king permission to effect service through the defendants’ Facebook accounts. 
The lawyers had handily located both defendants on the biggest social networ- 
king site. To that end they used the personal information the couple had supplied 
themselves during the loan application process. They were able to link the de-
fendants’ date of birth and their e-mail addresses to the Facebook profiles (which 
were, fortunately for the plaintiff, not protected by stringent privacy settings). 
Furthermore, they found that both defendants were friends on Facebook. Master 
Harper of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory therefore gave 
plaintiff MKM the green light to inform defendants of the entry and terms of 
the default judgment via a private Facebook message. In addition, the order had 
to be served via e-mail and by leaving a sealed copy at their last known address.
Although the germ of social media service lies Down Under, the cur-
rent centre of gravity for this rather contentious method of service has arguably 
11  Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, MKM Capital Pty Ltd. v. Corbo & Poyser, 16 
December 2008, case no. SC 608, text on file with the authors.
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shifted to the United States. The first approval by an American court came in the 
case of Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe.12 A wife wished to divorce her husband 
but it was believed he had left the territory of the United States.13 She had a sus-
picion that he had moved back to Ivory Coast. As she had no physical address for 
her soon-to-be ex-husband, she petitioned the court for approval to send notice 
by general delivery, where the post office holds mail until the recipient comes 
to the post office to pick it up.14 Judge Kevin S. Burke noted: “While the Court 
considered publication in a legal newspaper, it is unlikely that Respondent would 
ever see this. It is more likely that Respondent could receive notice on the internet. 
The traditional way to get service by publication is antiquated and is prohibitively 
expensive. Service is critical, and technology provides a cheaper and hopefully more 
effective way of finding Respondent.”15 The judge is further quoted as stating that: 
“Nobody, particularly poor people, is going to look at the legal newspaper to notice 
that their spouse wants to get divorced.”16 He ordered service to include, but not 
be limited to, contact via any Facebook, Myspace, or other social networking site, 
contact via e-mail and contact through information that would appear through 
an internet search engine such as Google.17
B. Conditions 
State court litigation is governed by state law provisions whereas the Fe- 
deral Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) determine the service regime for federal 
cases. For domestic service Rule 4(e)(1) FRCP refers to state provisions as it per-
mits following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where 
service is made. Under state law more unconventional methods of service are 
12  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
13  VAN HORN, Hans, “Evolutionary Pull, Practical Difficulties, and Ethical Boundaries: Using 
Facebook to Serve Process on International Defendants”, Global Business & Development Law 
Journal, vol. 26, 2013, 555-576, 566; EISENBERG, Alyssa, “Keep Your Facebook Friends Close 
and Your Process Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases 
Involving Domestic Defendants”, San Diego Law Review, vol. 51, 2014, 779-822, 790.
14  WARD, Stephanie, “Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites 
to Notify Defendants”, American Bar Association Journal, vol. 97, no. 10, 2011, 14-16, 14.
15  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
16  WARD, Stephanie, “Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites 
to Notify Defendants”, American Bar Association Journal, vol. 97, no. 10, 2011, 14.
17  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
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available in comparison to the federal rules. In some states catch-all provisions 
are in place. §308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (N.Y. CPLR), 
for instance, states that the court may order service in any manner, if the other 
(traditional) methods of service provided by § 308 N.Y. CPLR are impracticable. 
Impracticability however “does not require proof of due diligence or of actual prior 
attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the statute”.18 For service 
abroad, Rule 4(f)(3) FRCP gives the judge the possibility to order any method 
he deems appropriate, as long as the method is not prohibited by international 
agreement. The provision offers this option without any need for the plaintiff to 
first attempt service via the other methods listed in Rule 4(f) FRCP.19   
A scrutiny of the available cases reveals that the majority of courts have 
approved of social media service in combination with another form of service. 
In Mpafe v. Mpafe, for example, service through social networking platforms was 
ordered together with inter alia e-mail service.20 In Ferrarese v. Shaw plaintiff 
begun proceedings against his ex-wife who had disappeared with their daughter. 
The woman remained elusive and could not be served. The federal court deci- 
ded that service on the ex-wife should be effected via e-mail, Facebook message 
and certified mail on defendant’s last known address and on defendant’s sister.21 
In Federal Trade Commission v. PCCare247 Inc. the Federal Trade Commission 
brought suit against five foreign defendants who were involved in a fraudulent 
organisation trying to extract money from American citizens by deceiving them 
into believing that their computers were infected. On the basis of Rule 4(f)(3) 
FRCP the New York District Court granted the FTC’s request for permission to 
serve documents on the defendants via e-mail and Facebook.22 The Family Court 
decision in Noel Biscocho v. Anna Maria Antigua is an excellent example of the 
judicial hesitance to completely step away from traditional methods of service 
in favour of the newly discovered service channel offered by social media. A 
father who was seeking to modify an order of child support for his son based on 
the alleged emancipation of the boy was allowed to serve the mother via Face-
book. However, he also had to follow up with a mailing of the summons and the 
18  District Court for the Southern District of New York, Fortunato v. Chase Bank, 7 June 2012, 
2012 WL 2086950; District Court for the Southern District of New York, S.E.C. v. HGI, Inc., 8 
November 1999, 99 Civ. 3866, 1999 WL 1021087.
19  United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 
20 March 2002, 284 F.3d, 1007, at 1015.
20  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
21  United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Giovanni Ferrarese v. Vinda Shaw, 19 
January 2016, 164 F.Supp.3d 361 (2016).
22  District Court for the Southern District of New York, FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 7 March 2013, 
2013 WL 841037.
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petition to the mother’s last known address, even though the court recognised 
that prior service at that address had been unsuccessful (the mother had moved 
without leaving a forwarding address) and her physical whereabouts uncertain.23
This cautious attitude is, however, not shared by all courts. Baidoo v. 
Blood-Dzraku appears to be the first reported case in which the court approved 
service by Facebook message as the sole method of service. The plaintiff was a 
married woman who wanted to divorce her husband. She had no physical ad-
dress for him and he could not be served in person. Therefore, the wife peti-
tioned the court for service via Facebook. The court did not require service via 
publication as a backup method to Facebook, deeming the former to be “essen-
tially statutorily authorized non-service”.24 Similarly, in St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait 
Finance House the matter to be decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to damages from a number of defendants in connection with the financing of 
terrorist organisation ISIS and the subsequent slaying of Assyrian Christians 
in Iraq and Syria. The plaintiff attempted to serve one of the defendants, a Ku-
waiti-born Salafi sheikh, but came up empty. It, therefore, turned to the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking permission 
to effect service via Twitter, the American social networking platform used by 
the defendant to collect money to fund terrorist activities. The court agreed with 
service through Twitter as the only method to be used.25 
The available case law tends to impose two requirements regarding the 
social media account to be served. First, the plaintiff has to provide the court 
with evidence that the account actually belongs to the defendant (authentica-
tion requirement). Second, the plaintiff needs to demonstrate that the defen- 
dant makes regular use of his account (evidence of use requirement). Both are 
logical conditions given the fact that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes that notice should be “reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”.26 
In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku the plaintiff was aided by the existence of con-
versations between her and her husband on Facebook. She submitted an affidavit 
23  Family Court of the State of New York (County of Richmond), Noel B. v. Anna Maria A., 12 
September 2014, case no. F00787-13/14B, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4708; COLEMAN, Kristina, 
“Beyond Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku: Service of Process Through Facebook and Other Social Media 
Platforms Through an Indiana Lens”, Indiana Law Review, vol. 50, 2017, 645-671, 660.
24  Supreme Court of New York County, Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 27 March 2015, 48 Misc 3d 316.
25  United States District Court for the Northern District of California, St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait 
Finance House, et al., 30 September 2016, 2016 WL 5725002.
26  U.S. Supreme Court, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 24 April 1950, 339 U.S. 314 
(1950).
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to which she annexed copies of the exchanges between her and the defendant 
on Facebook and in which she identified the defendant as the subject of the 
photographs on the Facebook page in question. While such statements do not 
constitute absolute proof, the court was satisfied that the account did belong to 
the untraceable defendant. As to evidence of regular use, the court was equally 
satisfied as the exchanges between the plaintiff and the defendant indicated that 
the latter regularly logged into his account, countering the risk of him not seeing 
the summons until the time to respond had passed.27 Conversely, in Fortunato 
v. Chase Bank the defendant wanted to bring the plaintiff ’s daughter into the 
litigation. The request for service through the Facebook account of the daughter 
was denied for reasons of uncertainty regarding the authenticity of said account. 
The court argued that: “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or 
incomplete information, and thus, there is no way for the Court to confirm whether 
the Nicole Fortunato the investigator found is in fact the third-party defendant to 
be served.”28 
2.3. Short Overview of Service of Process in Belgium
In Belgium civil proceedings are initiated either by a writ of summons 
or by means of a petition. The most common method is the delivery of the writ 
of summons to the defendant by the bailiff.29 The Belgian Judicial Code lists a 
number of methods to effect this service of process (art. 33 et seq.). The bailiff 
will respect a certain order and will try to serve the defendant in person first. 
Service in person means that the bailiff hand delivers the writ of summons to the 
defendant. It can take place wherever the defendant can be found. If the defen- 
dant refuses to accept service, this refusal will not prevent service in person from 
being accomplished. The bailiff makes a note of this refusal on the writ.30
If service in person is not possible, service can be effected at the domicile 
or, in absence of a domicile, the place of residence of the defendant, by leaving a 
copy of the writ with a relative, servant or agent, provided that the person is 16 
years old or above.31 If the previous method of service is not possible, the bailiff 
27  Supreme Court of New York County, Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 27 March 2015, 48 Misc 3d 314-
315.
28  District Court for the Southern District of New York, Fortunato v. Chase Bank, 7 June 2012, 2012 
WL 2086950.
29  TAELMAN, Piet & VAN SEVEREN, Claudia, Civil procedure in Belgium, 1st ed., Mechelen, 
Wolters Kluwer, 2018, 89. 
30  Art. 33 Belgian Judicial Code.
31  Art. 35 Belgian Judicial Code.
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can leave a copy of the writ in a sealed envelope at the domicile or, in absence 
of a domicile, the place of residence of the defendant. The next business day at 
the latest the bailiff will send a letter to the defendant via registered mail, infor- 
ming him of the date and time of the bailiff ’s visit and of the possibility to obtain 
a copy of the writ at the bailiff ’s office during a period of three months.32 The 
sending of the registered letter is a precautionary measure, without any effect on 
the service.33
Since 31 December 2016, the date of the entry into force of the so-
called Potpourri III Act of 4 May 2016, the possibility for the bailiff exists to 
serve through e-mail. In civil matters the bailiff may choose the method of ser-
vice (personal service or electronic service via e-mail) depending on the cir- 
cumstances specific to the case.34   
The bailiff can either use the “gerechtelijk elektronisch adres” (a unique 
e-mail address, issued by the government35) of the defendant or, for people who 
do not have such an address, the “adres van elektronische woonstkeuze” (a re- 
gular e-mail address, not issued by the government)36. In the latter case explicit 
consent needs to be obtained from the defendant each time the bailiff wishes 
to serve him through that e-mail address.37 To that end the bailiff will send a 
request for consent to the “adres van elektronische woonstkeuze” of the defen- 
dant.38 In both cases the e-mail sent by the bailiff does not contain the actual do- 
cument to be served. Rather, the content of the documents can only be consulted 
on the digital platform (the Registry) created for that purpose. The defendant 
can only gain access to the content of the document after having identified and 
authenticated himself using his electronic id card (eID) and pincode or a techni-
cal equivalent method. 
Within 24 hours of sending the service or the request for consent, the 
bailiff will receive a confirmation message from the Registry, indicating that ser-
vice has actually been effected. If no such confirmation is received within that 
time frame, electronic service is not possible and needs to be effected in person.39 
When the defendant opens the e-mail message, the Registry notifies the bailiff. If 
no notification of opening is received within 24 hours of sending the service or 
32  Art. 38, §1 Belgian Judicial Code.
33  Cass. 17 December 1998, Arr. Cass. 1998, 1155.
34  Art. 32quater/3, §2 Belgian Judicial Code.
35  Art. 32, 5° Belgian Judicial Code.
36  Art. 32, 6° Belgian Judicial Code.
37  Art. 32quater/1, §1, second sentence Belgian Judicial Code.
38  Art. 32quater/1, §2, first sentence Belgian Judicial Code.
39  Art. 32quater/1, §2, first and third sentence iuncto art. 32quater/3, §3 Belgian Judicial Code.
The law in the 21st century: a Sisyphean struggle to keep up with technological evolutions? 
J. De Bruyne, C. Vanleenhove
99
the request for consent, the bailiff will notify the defendant the next business day 
through regular mail that electronic service has been effected.40
In case the defendant does not have a known domicile or place of resi-
dence in Belgium, service abroad will have to take place. Service in another EU 
Member State will be regulated by the EU Service Regulation.41 For service in 
non-EU states that are a member of the Hague Service Convention, that Con-
vention will apply. If the non-EU country where the defendant is domiciled or 
resides, is not bound by the Hague Convention, service is effected by registered 
letter through air mail.42
If the defendant does not have a known domicile or place of residence at 
all (neither in Belgium nor abroad), the bailiff will serve the writ on the public 
prosecutor of the jurisdiction of the court which will deal with the claim.43
2.4. Looking into the Crystal Ball: Social Media Service in 
Belgium? 
In this part, we will not attempt to forecast whether the Belgian legislator 
will ever decide to incorporate social media service as a service method. We will, 
however, set out which choices can be made and will signal some of the issues 
that will have to be dealt with. 
First of all, one can wonder which advantages social media offer. One 
distinct advantage of social media service lies in the fact that it is able to achieve 
a high likelihood of actual notice. Users of social media platforms typically ac-
cess their accounts on a regular basis.44 A recent press release by Facebook, for 
instance, showed that there were 1.32 billion daily active users on average world-
wide for June 2017 and 2.01 billion monthly active users as of 30 June 2017.45 
Social media are oftentimes accessed on mobile devices. On these devices users 
run applications that push instant notifications alerting the account holder of 
40  Art. 32quater/1, §2, in fine Belgian Judicial Code. 
41  Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, 
OJ L 324. 
42  Art. 40, first paragraph Belgian Judicial Code.
43  Art. 40, second paragraph Belgian Judicial Code.
44  KNAPP, Keeley, “#serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Service of Pro-
cess in the 21st Century”, Louisiana Law Review, vol. 74, no. 2, 2014, 547-579, 564
45  See in this regard: https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2017/Face-
book-Reports-Second-Quarter-2017-Results/default.aspx
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activity on his profile.46 Besides, if service is performed via a private Facebook 
message or via a post on the defendant’s Facebook wall, the likelihood of actual 
notice is even amplified. Under the default settings, the defendant will receive 
a notification through e-mail of the message or of the post and any subsequent 
comments.47
Compared to the second-newest kid on the block, e-mail service, social 
media holds a few trump cards. In case of service via e-mail there is no possi-
bility to determine whether the e-mail address belongs to the defendant unless 
the defendant states so himself.48 A social media account, on the other hand, can 
be scrutinised to verify the identity of the holder if the privacy settings allow it. 
Additionally, e-mail is more prone to spam attacks.49 In that regard, social media 
networks fare better.50 Spam messages are less common on social media plat-
forms and malicious messages are less problematic because users can often view 
the sender’s profile without opening the message or they can adjust their settings 
to disallow messages from individuals who they have not added as “friends”.51
Having argued that service through social media platforms can have an 
added value, a subsequent question would be whether there is a need for this 
type of service to be implemented in Belgium. It is unlikely that the Belgian le- 
gislator will introduce social media service as a self-standing independent me- 
thod. For Belgium, where e-mail service is still in its infancy, this would be too 
radical and controversial. In our opinion, there could nevertheless be a place for 
this innovative method in the Belgian system. 
In part 2.3 it was explained that service on defendants who do not have a 
known domicile or place of residence is replaced by service on the public pro- 
secutor of the jurisdiction of the competent court.52 In Belgium the “Nationale 
46  UPCHURCH, Angela, “”Hacking” Service of Process: Using Social Media to Provide Constitu-
tionally Sufficient Notice of Process”, UALR Review, vol. 38, 2016, 559-625, 601.
47  District Court for the Southern District of New York, FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 7 March 2013, 
2013 WL 841037, 5. 
48  KNAPP, Keeley, “#serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Service of Pro-
cess in the 21st Century”, Louisiana Law Review, vol. 74, no. 2, 2014, 569.
49  WOLBER, Jeffrey, “Opening a Can of Worms and Viruses: The Impact of E-Service on E-Mail 
Users Everywhere”, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 61, 2016-2017, 449-470, 450, foot-
note 1. 
50  SHULTZ, Andriana, “Superpoked and Served: Service of Process via Social Networking Sites”, 
University of Richmond Law Review, vol. 43, 2009, 1497-1528, 1525, footnote 205 (statement 
made in the context of Facebook).
51  WOLBER, Jeffrey, “Opening a Can of Worms and Viruses: The Impact of E-Service on E-Mail 
Users Everywhere”, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 61, 2016-2017, 450, footnote 1.
52  Art. 40, second paragraph Belgian Judicial Code.
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Kamer van Gerechtsdeurwaarders” (the National Chamber of Bailiffs) does not 
keep statistics on the number of times service is in that regard effected on the 
public prosecutor. In the Netherlands, on the contrary, such figures are available. 
The Dutch service rules also require that a defendant without a known domicile 
or place of residence be served through the office of the public prosecutor at the 
court where the claim will be heard. In addition, an abstract of the writ must 
be published in the “Staatscourant”.53 The “Staatscourant” is an official online 
gazette containing inter alia different types of judicial announcements.54 An Act 
of 11 February 2015 made the use of this online tool compulsory since 1 July 
2015.55 Before that date these so-called “public writs” were published in daily 
newspapers. According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Act 
45.000 public writs are served each year.56 Additionally, it is stated that bailiffs 
receive little or no response to public writs published in newspapers.57 The Dutch 
legislator considered that the publication of these writs on a public site on the 
internet would increase the odds that the defendants would see it, leading to the 
putting into use of the “Staatscourant”.58 
There is no reason why these findings cannot be transposed to Belgium. It 
is extremely likely that the “artificial” service on the prosecutor does not inform 
the persons in question, given the results in the Netherlands where service on 
the prosecutor is even combined with service by publication. It is here that social 
media service could play a role. Belgian lawmakers could make it obligatory for 
plaintiffs to undertake a reasonable attempt to serve the elusive defendant via 
his social media channels, if any. In the Netherlands this idea has already been 
suggested by the “Adviescommissie Burgerlijk Procesrecht” (Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Procedural Law) in the build-up to the adoption of the Act of 11 
February 2015.59 It can be expected that such a subsidiary place for social media 
service will prompt less resistance than embracing it as a full-blown mechanism. 
Furthermore, because social media service is deployed as a supplement to an 
established method, it will alleviate at least some of the sceptical concerns raised 
53  Art. 54.2 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.
54  See for more information: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/staatscourant.
55  Wet van 11 februari 2015 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering en 
enige andere wetten in verband met bekendmakingen aan personen zonder bekende woon- of 
verblijfplaats, Stb. 2015, 82.
56  Memorie van Toelichting, 4.
57  Memorie van Toelichting, 2.
58  Memorie van Toelichting, 2.
59  Letter of 19 September 2013 concerning consultatiedocument Wijziging van het wetboek van 
burgerlijke rechtsvordering en enige andere wetten in verband met bekendmakingen aan personen 
zonder bekende woon- of verblijfplaats, 2, no. 3.
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by its opponents. In that way, the policy choice would correspond to the U.S. 
example where social media service is, in most instances, offered in combination 
with another more conventional method (see part 2.2.B).   
As to the concrete organisation of social media service, the Belgian le- 
gislator will face further issues. Certain safeguards relating to the authentication 
and regular use of the account will need to be construed. The American expe- 
rience might serve as a source of inspiration. A further specific difficulty that can 
be identified relates to the bailiff who has to effect the service. Does the bailiff 
have to use an official account or can he use the account of the plaintiff or can he 
even send the notice via a fake account?60 In case social media service is used as 
a supplementary method for defendants without a known address, service could 
perhaps be entrusted to the plaintiff (or his lawyer). Time will tell to what extent 
Belgium will “connect” with social media, if at all. 
3. Case Study: Autonomous Vehicles and Liability 
Another example we will discuss are autonomous vehicles. The increased 
use of such vehicles needs to be seen in a broader perspective of robots and ar-
tificial intelligence (part 3.1). Once some preliminary considerations have been 
discussed, we will proceed with an analysis of aspects related to the liability for 
damage caused by self-driving cars (part 3.2).  
3.1. Preliminary Considerations on Robots 
Finding an appropriate definition of a ‘robot’ is not straightforward due 
to its “a-technical nature, both from an engineering and a legal point of view”.61 
Calo concludes that a robot is a machine with three qualities: (1) a robot can 
sense its environment, (2) a robot has the capacity to process the information it 
senses, and (3) a robot is organised to act directly upon its environment.62 Defi- 
ning artificial intelligence (AI) might be even more challenging as there is no 
60  In the United States a similar discussion exists in relation to the ethical rules governing the 
conduct of lawyers performing social media service. See for example: VAN HORN, Hans, “Evo-
lutionary Pull, Practical Difficulties, and Ethical Boundaries: Using Facebook to Serve Process on 
International Defendants”, Global Business & Development Law Journal, vol. 26, 2013, 570-574. 
61  BERTOLINI, Andrea, “Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Appli-
cations and Liability Rules”, Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 5, no. 2, 2013, 214-247, 219. 
62  CALO, Ryan, Robots in American Law, University of Washington School of Law Research 
Paper no. 2016-04, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598, 6, read on 15 
April 2018; CALO, Ryan, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw”, California Law Review, vol. 
103, no. 3, 2015, 513-563, 529.
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consensus on this concept.63 Artificial intelligence has been the subject of much 
discussion and has caused a lot of confusion.64 AI is an umbrella term comprised 
of many different techniques65 and is best understood as a set of techniques 
aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition by using 
machines. In this regard, the concept of machine learning is important. Machine 
learning implies that a system does not only rely on predefined instructions to 
determine its behaviour but also on the independent analysis of large amounts of 
collected data. It refers to the capacity of computer algorithms to automatically 
learn or improve in performance on a task over time.66
Regardless of the precise definition of both concepts, human activities are 
increasingly being replaced by robots.67 Robots are becoming prevalent in our 
daily, social and professional life.68 Several examples can be used as an illustra-
tion. Collaborative robots or ‘CoBots’ have been designed to physically interact 
with humans in a shared workspace.69 Prototypes of robots such as Riba can be 
used in the health sector to perform heavy physical nursing care tasks requiring 
human contact (e.g. lifting a bedridden patient from the bed to a wheelchair and 
63  See for more information: TURING, Alan Mathison, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, 
Mind, no. 49, 1950, 433-460; RUSSELL, Stuart & NORVIG, Peter, Artificial Intelligence: A 
Modern Approach, 3rd ed., New Jersey, Pearson New International, 2010. 
64  KOK, Joost Nico, Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed., Oxford, EOLSS Publications, 2009, 2. 
65  CALO, Ryan, “Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap”, U.C. Davis Law Review, 
vol. 51, 2017, 399-435, 405. 
66  CALO Ryan, “Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap”, U.C. Davis Law Review, 
vol 51, 2017, 405; SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Pre-
dictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 121-181, 147. 
67  HALLEVY, Gabriel, “The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities - From Science 
Fiction to Legal Social Control”, Akron Intellectual Property Journal, vol. 4, no. 2, 2010, 171-
201, 172. See for an overview: IVANOV, Stanislav Hristov, “Robonomics - Principles, Benefits, 
Challenges, Solutions”, Yearbook of Varna University of Management, vol. 10, 2017, 283-293. 
68  LEENES, Ronald et al, “Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines”, Law, Innovation 
and Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 7. 
69  See for more information: PREIMESBERGER, Chris, Why CA Technologies is Moving into Col-
laborative Robotics, eWeek, 17 January 2018, http://www.eweek.com/innovation/why-ca-tech-
nologies-is-moving-into-collaborative-robotics, read on 20 April 2018. 
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back).70 Robots have been used to run a hotel71 or sell coffee in stores.72 There 
are also growing concerns in the international community regarding so-called 
“killer robots” that might be used in armed conflicts.73 Robots are increasingly 
used in the legal profession as well. Lawyers will eventually be replaced by algo-
rithms,74 while cases might in the future be adjudicated by an artificial intelli-
gence judge.75 A more prominent example is the rise of self-driving cars or au-
tonomous vehicles.76 According to recent predictions, fully autonomous vehicles 
could already be available within five to twenty years.77 One could, therefore, say 
that the challenges posed by robots will only become more acute in light of the 
explosive growth of the robotics industry over the next decade. In sum, we “are 
70  MUKAI, Toshiharu et al., “Development of a Nursing-Care Assistant Robot RIBA That Can 
Lift a Human in Its Arms”, 2010 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and 
Systems, 18-22 October 2010, 5996-6001, 5996. 
71  RAJESH, Monisha, Inside Japan’s first robot-staffed hotel, The Guardian, 14 August 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2015/aug/14/japan-henn-na-hotel-staffed-by-robots, read on 
19 April 2018. 
72  X, Nestlé employs fleet of robots to sell coffee machines in Japan, The Guardian, 1 December 
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/01/nestle-robots-coffee-machines-ja-
pan-george-clooney-pepper-android-softbank, read on 19 April 2018.
73  See for example: CROOTOF, Rebecca, “The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Im-
plications”, Cardozo Law Review, no. 36, 2015, 1837-1916; SMITH, Mark, Is ‘killer robot’ 
warfare closer than we think?, 25 August 25 2017, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/busi-
ness-41035201, read on 30 April 2018.
74  See for example: X, Ready for robot lawyers? How students can prepare for the future of law, The 
Guardian, 31 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jul/31/ready-for-robot-lawyers-
how-students-can-prepare-for-the-future-of-law, read on 22 April 2018. See, however: REMUS, 
Dana & LEVY, Frank, “Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law”, 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, vol. 30, 2017, 501-558. 
75  ALETRAS, Nikolaos, TSARAPATSANIS, Dimitrios, PREOTIUC-PIETRO, Daniel & LAMPOS, 
Vasileios, “Predicting judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: a Natural Lan-
guage Processing perspective”, PeerJ Computer Science, no. 2, 2016, https://peerj.com/articles/cs-
93/, read on 15 April 2018. See in this regard also: CALO Ryan, Robots in American Law, Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law Research Paper no. 2016-04, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598, 25-32, read on 18 April 2018. 
76  See for more information: SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opaci-
ty, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 121-181; ZOHN, 
Jeffrey, “When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving cars that cause damages”, 
University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2015, no. 2, 2015, 461-485. 
77  ANDERSON James, KALRA Nidhi, STANLEY Karlyn, SORENSEN Paul, SAMARAS 
Constantine & OLUWATOLA Tobi, Autonomous Vehicle Technology – A Guide for Policymak-
ers, California, RAND, 4, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html, read on 17 
April 2018.  
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in the midst of a robotics revolution”,78 which is poised to be the next transfor- 
mative technology.79 
This increased use of robots will have several advantages. Robots are 
more accurate and efficient because they are faster and can process information 
better than humans.80 As a consequence, they can perform many tasks better 
than their human counterparts.81 Companies from various economic sectors al-
ready rely on robotics and artificial intelligence to decrease costs, generate reve-
nues, enhance product quality and improve their competitiveness.82 In addition 
to these general benefits, robots can also have more specific advantages for the 
sector where they are used. Take the example of self-driving cars. Transport will 
become more time efficient with autonomous car technology.83 Human passen-
gers can occupy themselves with other professional or leisure activities - as they 
do no longer have to pay attention to the road. The use of SDCs will also lead 
to a better flow of traffic and less accidents, which results in fewer traffic jams. 
All these factors have a positive influence on productivity and the work/life ba- 
lance.84 One of the most important advantages of autonomous vehicle technolo-
gy is that traffic will become much safer with software operating the vehicle. The 
78  CALO, Ryan, Robots in American Law, University of Washington School of Law Research 
Paper no. 2016-04, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598, 3, read on 15 
April 2018.
79  CALO, Ryan, “Open Robotics”, Maryland Law Review, vol. 70, 2011, 571-613, 571.
80  TZAFESTAS, Spyros, Roboethics: A Navigating Overview, 1st ed., Athens, Springer, 2015, 147. 
81  DEITEL, Harvey & DEITEL, Barbara, Computers and Data Processing: International Edition, 
1st ed., Orlando, Academic Press, 2014, 434. 
82  IVANOV, Stanislav Hristov, “Robonomics - Principles, Benefits, Challenges, Solutions”, Year-
book of Varna University of Management, vol. 10, 2017, 283-285, 283-293 with further referenc-
es.   
83  See for example: ZOHN Jeffrey R., “When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving 
cars that cause damages”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2015, 
no. 2, 2015, 471; DUFFY, Sophia & HOPKINS, Jamie, “Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Auton-
omous Car Liability”, SMU Science & Technology Law Review, vol. 16, 2013, 453-480, 475 & 
479.
84  DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehi-
cles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 325 with further 
references.
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number of accidents will reduce as computers are generally much better drivers 
than their human equivalents.85
At the same time, however, the introduction of robots also poses many 
challenges. Robots and artificial intelligence will have implications on various 
facets of our society. For instance, different studies illustrate that robotisation 
will affect the labour market.86 SDCs might replace persons nowadays employed 
in the transportation sector or other related industries.87 Experts also predict a 
decline in the so-called ‘crash economy’ once autonomous cars are commonly 
used. Involved in that economy are inter alia  garages, lawyers, insurance compa-
nies, physical therapists and, ironic as it is, the car industry itself.88 The increased 
use of robots will also pose several challenges from a legal or regulatory point of 
view.89 Without going into further detail, robots might affect human rights such 
as privacy or the freedom of speech,90 influence court proceedings or decision 
85  See for example: ZOHN, Jeffrey, “When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving 
cars that cause damages”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2015, 
no. 2, 2015, 471; GURNEY, Jeffrey, “Sue my car not me: products liability and accidents involv-
ing autonomous vehicles”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2013, 
no. 2, 2013, 247-277, 250-251; DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage 
Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, 
no. 3, 2018, 325 with further references.
86  See for example: ACEMOGLU, Daron & RESTREPO, Pascual, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from 
US Labor Markets, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 17-04, 17 March 2017, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941263, read on 28 April 2018; FREY, 
Carl Benedikt & OSBORNE, Michael, “The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to 
computerisation?”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 114, 2017, 254-280, 254. 
87  DE BRUYNE Jan & TANGHE Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: 
a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 326-327 with further 
references.
88  ANDERSON James, KALRA Nidhi, STANLEY Karlyn, SORENSEN Paul, SAMARAS 
Constantine, OLUWATOLA Tobi, Autonomous Vehicle Technology – A Guide for Policymakers, 
California, RAND, xvii & 38-40, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html, 
read on 17 April 2018; DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused 
by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 
2018, 326-327 further references.
89  See in general: LEENES, Ronald et al, “Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines”, 
Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 2. 
90  See for example: BALKIN, Jack, “Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation”, UC Davis Law Review, vol. 51, 2018, 1149-
1210; MASSARO, Toni & NORTON, Helen, “Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial In-
telligence», Northwestern University Law Review”, vol. 110, 2016, 1169-1194. 
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making processes91 and raise questions of corporate law.92 More importantly, 
liability issues will also become important in the future as robots will inevitably 
cause damage. In 2015, for instance, it was reported in the press that a robot 
killed a man at a Volkswagen factory in Germany.93 Examples of accidents with 
autonomous vehicles are also interesting in this regard and will be examined in 
the next part. 
3.2. The Liability Framework and Autonomous Vehicles  
Vehicles will not suddenly become fully autonomous or self-driving. 
Instead, technology will gradually take over a user’s control over the vehicle. 
Technology has already partly taken over some of the user’s tasks in controlling 
the vehicle. Examples thereof are adaptive cruise control, lane keeping assistance 
and automatic parking systems. These forms of partial vehicle are covered by 
the umbrella term Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS).94 Vehicles will 
eventually be able to take persons from one place to another without any human 
interference.95 In that case, one can speak of a fully autonomous or driverless 
91  See for example: REMUS, Dana & LEVY, Frank, “Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Law-
yers, and the Practice of Law”, Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, vol. 30, 2017, 501; COG-
LIANESE, Cary & LEHR, David, “Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the 
Machine-Learning Era”, Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 105, 2017, 1147-1223.
92  See for example: MÖSLEIN, Florian, “Robots in the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and 
Corporate Law”, in: BARFIELD, Woodrow & PAGALLO, Ugo, Research Handbook on the Law 
of Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed., Edward Elgar, 2018, forthcoming. 
93  HUGGLER, Justin, Robot kills man at Volkswagen plant in Germany, The Telegraph, 2 July 
2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11712513/Robot-kills-
man-at-Volkswagen-plant-in-Germany.html, read on 1 May 2018. 
94  See for more information: SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opa-
city, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 134-135; VAN 
WEES Kiliaan, “Vehicle Safety Regulations and ADAS: Tensions Between Law and Technolo-
gy”, in: X, IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, The Hague, 2004, 
4011-4016. 
95  See for an overview of the technology used in autonomous vehicles: SURDEN, Harry & WIL-
LIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo 
Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 129-150; ANDERSON, James, KALRA, Nidhi, STANLEY, Karlyn, 
SORENSEN, Paul, SAMARAS, Constantine & OLUWATOLA, Tobi, Autonomous Vehicle 
Technology – A Guide for Policymakers, California, RAND, 55-74, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR443-2.html, read on 17 April 2018.   
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vehicle.96 Today, only prototypes of such vehicles exist. They are currently being 
tested on the road by companies such as Google and Tesla. 97
Despite the increased safety as a result of SDCs, road accidents will not 
suddenly disappear. Autonomous vehicles will share the road with ‘regular’ 
non-autonomous cars and other road users during a long transition period. Re-
cent accidents show that the technology used in autonomous vehicles is indeed 
not entirely flawless. Technological sensors do not work perfectly in exceptional 
circumstances such as stormy weather or heavy rainfalls. The autopilot sensors 
of a Tesla car, for instance, were not able to distinguish a white tractor-trailer 
crossing the highway from the bright sky above, leading to a fatal crash.98 In 
February 2016, an autonomous vehicle hit a bus because it did not know that 
long vehicles are less inclined to stop and give way.99 More recently, several news-
papers reported an accident with a Tesla autopilot vehicle, which resulted in the 
driver’s death.100 
Against this background, the question arises whether the legal framework 
dealing with the liability for damage caused by SDCs will need a fundamental 
make-over101 or instead minor changes might be sufficient. In other words, one 
has to assess “whether tort liability rules – as they are currently shaped – are suited 
to govern the “car minus driver” complexity, while simultaneously holding on to 
96  SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Predictability, and 
Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 132-133. 
97  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 324-371; DE BRUYNE, Jan & VANLEENHOVE, Cedric, 
“The Rise of Self-Driving Cars: Is the Private International Law Framework for non-contractual 
obligations posing a bump in the road?”, IALS Student Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2018, 14-26. 
98  See in this regard: Tesla’s Blog, A Tragic Loss, 30 June 2016, https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/
tragic-loss, read on 22 April 2018. 
99  See in this regard: BOWLES, Nellie, Google self-driving car collides with bus in California, ac-
cident report says, The Guardian, 1 March 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
feb/29/google-self-driving-car-accident-california, read on 19 April 2018. 
100  See for example: HULL, Dana & SMITH, Tim, Tesla Driver Died Using Autopilot, With Hands 
Off Steering Wheel, Bloomberg Technology, 31 March 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-03-31/tesla-says-driver-s-hands-weren-t-on-wheel-at-time-of-accident, read on 1 
May 2018; BOUDETTE, Neal, Fatal Tesla Crash Raises New Questions About Autopilot System, 
New York Times, 31 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/business/tesla-crash-au-
topilot-musk.html, read on 1 May 2018. 
101  SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Predictability, and 
Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 136. 
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their theoretical basis”.102 In any case, some changes to the legal framework will 
be inevitable. The Belgian Highway Code, for example, is not yet adapted to the 
introduction of autonomous car technology as it still requires that each vehicle 
has a ‘driver’.103 The driver must at all times be able to perform the necessary dri- 
ving actions and must have his vehicle under control.104 It is conceivable that the 
situation in other EU Member States will be quite similar. The existing liability 
rules might also need some changes with the commercialisation of SDCs. Re- 
liance on fault-based liability will become uncertain in the context of autono-
mous vehicles. It will, for instance, not be easy to determine who the ‘driver’ is 
in an autonomous vehicle and whether he can be held liable for a violation of 
the law that is actually committed by the vehicle itself (e.g. crossing a red light). 
Research also showed that it is by no means straightforward to hold the user of 
an autonomous vehicle liable for a negligent act in supervising the technology.105
Liability in traffic-related matters will, therefore, evolve from a fault-
based mechanism towards forms of strict liability. This means that victims will 
have to target other parties. There are different alternatives in national law. In 
Belgium, for instance, a party could sue the custodian of a defective object un-
der Article 1384, first paragraph, of the Belgian Civil Code (BCC).  That article 
imposes a strict liability regime for the custodian of a defective object for the 
damage caused by that object.106 Another more interesting possibility is to file 
a claim against the manufacturer of the vehicles or the software under the EU 
102  DAVOLA, Antonio, A Model for Tort Liability in a World of Driverless Cars: Establishing a 
Framework for the Upcoming Technology, 1 February 2018, 2, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3120679, read on 1 May 2018. 
103  Art. 8.1. Koninklijk besluit van 1 december 1975 houdende algemeen reglement op de politie van 
het wegverkeer en van het gebruik van de openbare weg, published on 9 December 1975 (Highway 
Code). 
104  Art. 8.3. Highway Code. See in this regard also the decision by the Belgian Court of Cassation, 
17 January 1989, Arr. Cass. 1988, 599 & Verkeersrecht-Jurisprudentie 1989, 181. 
105  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 344-347. 
106  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 348-354. 
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Product Liability Directive.107 Article 1 of the Directive stipulates that the pro-
ducer will be held liable for damage caused by a defect in his product.108 The 
question arises whether the Product Liability Directive is adapted to the reality 
of self-driving cars. In this regard, the GEAR 2030 High Level Group concluded 
that the motor insurance and product liability directives are sufficient at least for 
those systems expected by 2020. After that date, however, the application of the 
Product Liability Directive risks to create a number of problems.109 Against this 
background, we will examine whether this framework is inadequate and out of 
tune with the reality of SDCs by focusing on two elements,110 namely whether 
software can be qualified as product (part A) and the moment when the vehicle 
is put into circulation (part B).111
A. Qualification of Software 
Article 2 of the Product Liability Directive defines a product as all mova-
bles, with the exception of primary agricultural products and game, even though 
incorporated into another movable or into an immovable. There is a debate on 
the question whether software qualifies as product or not. There are several rea-
sons why software cannot be seen as product. For instance, software might be 
qualified as a service and not as a product. In addition, the Directive only men-
tions ‘movables’. Therefore, it relates to tangible goods only. It would otherwise 
make no sense to explicitly include electricity in the scope of the Directive.112 
This requirement is problematic for software products. Software is a collection 
107  Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 
210. See for a discussion of product liability and self-driving cars in the United States: SMITH, 
Bryant Walker, “Automated Driving and Product Liability”, Michigan State Law Review, vol. 
2017, no. 1, 2017, 1-74; GURNEY, Jeffrey K., “Sue my car not me: products liability and ac-
cidents involving autonomous vehicles”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & 
Policy, vol. 2013, no. 2, 2013, 257-277. 
108  Article 1 Product Liability Directive. According to Article 5, a product is defective if it does not 
provide the safety that a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account. 
109  High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in 
the European Union (GEAR 2030), “Ensuring that Europe has the most competitive, innovative 
and sustainable automotive industry of the 2030s and beyond”, October 2017, 43-44.
110  DAVOLA, Antonio, A Model for Tort Liability in a World of Driverless Cars: Establishing a 
Framework for the Upcoming Technology, 1 February 2018, 2, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3120679, read on 1 May 2018. 
111  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 355-364; 367-370.
112  Article 2 in fine Product Liability Directive. 
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of data and instructions that is imperceptible for the human eye. A software sys-
tem is thus often regarded as intangible. Accordingly, it might not fall within the 
scope of the Product Liability Act.113 
At the same time, however, there are also some reasons why software 
should fall within the scope of the Product Liability Directive. Software might be 
seen as the object of a service. It is, therefore, covered by the Directive. Software 
can also be qualified as a product because it is captured on a tangible medium or 
device (e.g. CD-ROM or USB). This has been affirmed by the European Com-
mission.114 Software an sich might be considered as a material good as well. The 
Directive could apply to software even if it is qualified as an intangible good. Af-
ter all, the inclusion of electricity clarifies that the drafters of the Directive aimed 
at a wide material scope. Legislators did not think of software in the early 1980s 
as personal computers only became commercially widespread during the second 
half of the 1980s. It is thus conceivable that software, in a teleological interpreta-
tion of the Directive, falls within the scope of the Directive. The European Court 
of Justice might come to a similar conclusion in the future. The inclusion of soft-
ware in the Directive would also reflect the current economic reality in which 
software is a commercial product just as any other product that may entail risks 
for users and third parties.115
B. Putting the Self-Driving Car into Circulation
Pursuant to Article 7(b) of Product Liability Directive, the manufacturer 
of the product can escape liability when he proves that it is probable that the de-
fect causing the damage did not exist at the time when the product was put into 
circulation or that this defect came into being afterwards. If software is qualified 
as a product, any update thereof could be considered an act by which the produ- 
cer brings a new product into circulation. However, it becomes more difficult 
with so-called self-learning systems. These systems are not periodically updated 
but continually improve themselves. For defects that are created in this way, a 
moment of putting the product into circulation cannot be indicated as the ma- 
nufacturer did not perform an act to that end. The same reasoning also applies to 
the liability of the manufacturer of the vehicle. The changes made by a self-lear- 
113  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE Jan & TANGHE Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, no. 8, 2018, 355-357. 
114  See in this regard: Written Question no. 706/88 of 5 July 1988 and Answer by Lord Cockfield on 
behalf of the Commission on 15 November 1988, OJ 114/42, 8 May 1989.  
115  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 355-357.
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ning system and the updates performed by the software producer can create de-
fects for which the car manufacturer is no longer liable. Indeed, those defects 
did not exist at the time when he put the vehicle into circulation. Although the 
vehicle meets the definition of a product, its manufacturer might thus easily 
escape liability if the damage is caused by a dysfunction in the software. One 
could argue that Article 7(b) Product Liability Directive should be inapplicable 
in those circumstances. This makes it possible for victims to file a claim against 
the manufacturer of the software even when the defect is created through the 
continuous self-development of software.116
4. Concluding Remarks 
The article examined whether some of the existing legal principles in two 
different fields are compatible with technological evolutions. As to service of 
process via social media, the article explored the remarkable finding that some 
courts in common law countries have allowed the notice of the commencement 
of civil proceedings to be effected via one or more social media accounts belon- 
ging to the defendant. In contrast, in continental EU jurisdictions this phenom-
enon does not exist. The article laid the conditions imposed by American courts 
for this type of service bare and subsequently gave an overview of the Belgian 
procedural framework. Even though it remains to be seen whether the Belgian 
legislator will ever be tempted by this novel method of service, it is submitted 
that social media service could be useful as a second layer of subsidiary notice 
when the defendant does not have a known address. With regard to self-driving 
cars, some legal changes at the national level are inevitable. Legislation dealing 
with road safety is not yet adopted to the introduction of autonomous vehicles. 
We have also shown that the application of some of the concepts used in the 
EU Product Liability Directive might become problematic when SDCs will be 
commercialised. For instance, the moment of putting the product into circu-
lation might be incompatible with autonomous systems. In any case, when po- 
licymakers would change the legal framework, they should take into account 
that a minor modification of one aspect (e.g. qualification of software) can have 
major consequences on the liability of the manufacturers of software or of the 
self-driving vehicle. Therefore, we suggest a balanced and well-considered ap-
proach when it comes to adapting the existing legal framework to technological 
evolutions.117
116  DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehi-
cles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 362-363 & 370. 
117  See in this regard also: DE BRUYNE, Jan & WERBROUCK, Jarich, “Merging self-driving cars 
with the Law”, Computer and Security Law Review, vol. 34, no. 5, 2018, forthcoming. 
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